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WILLIAM L. ROWE'S A PRIORI
ARGUMENT FOR ATHEISM
KlaasJ.Kraay

William Rowe's a posteriori arguments for the non-existence of God are wellknown. Rather less attention has been given, however, to Rowe's intriguing a
priori argument for atheism. In this paper, I examine the three published
responses to Rowe's a priori argument (due to Bruce Langtry, William Morris,
and Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder, respectively). I conclude that none is
decisive, but I show that Rowe's argument nevertheless requires more defence
than he provides.

The hypothesis of no prime worlds (NPW) holds that for any possible
world x that an omnipotent being has the power to actualize, there is a
better world, y, that the omnipotent being could have actualized instead
of X.I NPW is generally deployed to defend theism against the charge
that God failed to do his best in actualizing this world. 2 Sometimes this
view is deployed to defend theism against the charge that God failed to
do better in actualizing this world. 3 These defences are compelling, and,
accordingly, critics of theism have developed new anti-theistic arguments on NPW. Most anti-theistic arguments on this view are a
posteriori: they typically hold that a God-actualized world would exhibit
(or lack) certain features, and that, since the actual world fails (or seemingly fails) to conform to these expectations, it is reasonable to believe
that God does not exist. 4 Since most of these arguments appeal to certain claims about evil, they may be treated as versions of the problem of
evil. Such arguments are controversial, and the literature surrounding
them is vast.
Recently, a few authors have advanced versions of a remarkable a priori argument against theism on NPW. 5 This argument is ambitious: it
can be understood to suggest that God's existence is impossible on NPW.
If sound, then, this argument should force the theist to give up either
theism or NPW. In what follows, I discuss William L. Rowe's elegant
and intriguing articulation of this argument. I examine recent responses
to Rowe's argument due to Bruce Langtry, Thomas Morris, and Daniel
and Frances Howard-Snyder. 6 I conclude that none is successful, but I
show that Rowe's argument nevertheless requires more defence than he
provides. The a priori case against theism on NPW, then, not yet complete.
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I. Rowe's A Priori Argument for Atheism on NPW
Rowe's exposition of this argument is swift:
A being is necessarily an absolutely perfect moral being only if it is
not possible for there to be a being morally better than it. If a being
creates a world when there is some morally better world that it could
have created, then it is possible that there be a being morally better
than it. Since our assumption [NPW] implies that for any world an
omnipotent being creates there is a morally better world that it can
create, it follows that ,my such being who creates even a very good
world cannot be an absolutely perfect moral being. Although the
omnipotent being in question could be a very good moral agent and
enjoy a significant degree of freedom in creating among a number of
very good worlds, it could not be an absolutely perfect moral being.
The existence of the theistic God who creates a world is inconsistent
with the supposition that among the worlds he can create there is no
morally unsurpassable world. 7
The argument in this passage may be formalized in the following manner:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

On NPW, if there is an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good
being, then it is always possible for that being to actualize a
morally better world.
On NPW, if it is always possible for an omniscient, omnipotent,
perfectly good being to actualize a morally better world, then it
is always possible for that being to have been morally better.
Therefore, on NPW, if there is an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good being, then it is always possible for that being to
have been morally better.
On NPW, if ther~ is an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good
being, then it is not possible for that being to have been morally
better.
Therefore, on NPW, there is no omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good being.

Premise (1) is simply an expression of NPW, and premise (4) is an analytic
truth. Premise (2) is the crucial move in this argument, since it is required
for (3), and (3) and (4) together comprise the contradiction that completes
the reductio of the antecedent of (1). Rowe, it must be noted, offers no
explicit argument for premise (2). I concur with Bruce Langtry, who, referring to this premise, holds that J/[w]e ought, in the present context, be discontent with any mere appeal to intuition in defence of Rowe's premise,
but rather demand an argument in favour of it."8 So, why might one hold
(2)? This premise alleges a connection between the goodness of an actualized world and the goodness of the actualizing agent. Perhaps, then, Rowe
thinks that, ceteris paribus, in actualizing a better world, one performs a better action. And perhaps he also thinks that, ceteris paribus, if one performs a
better action, one is thereby a better agent: Both claims have been rejected
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by Rowe's critics, and these moves will be assessed in Sections II, III, and
IV. Since premise (2) seems to conflate these two distinct claims, it will be
useful to recast Rowe's argument in a manner that distinguishes them.
This will also enable us to see better precisely how Rowe's critics engage
his argument. Suppose, then, that we reformulate Rowe's argument in this
way: 10
(6)
(7)

On NPW, an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being is
possible.
On NPW, it is always possible for the product (or outcome) of the
world-actualizing action of the omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly
good being to have been better.

PI

If it is possible for the product (or outcome) of a world-actualizing action performed by some being to have been better,
then, ceteris paribus, it is possible for that action to have been
better.ll

(8)

Therefore, on NPW, it is always possible for the world-actualizing action of the omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being
to have been better.

P2

If it is possible for the world-actualizing action performed by
some being to have been better, then, ceteris paribus, it is possible for that being to have been .better.

Therefore, on NPW, it is always possible for the omnipotent,
omniscient, perfectly good being to have been better.
(10) On NPW, it is not possible for an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly
good being to have been better.
(11) Therefore, on NPW, no omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly
good being is possible.
(9)

The argument is now a straightforward reductio of (6).12 Premise (7) is a
restatement of NPW, and (10) is an analytic truth. (9) and (10) together
comprise the contradiction required to complete the reductio. The crucial
moves in this argument, then, are the inference from (7) to (8) and the
inference from (8) to (9). These inferences are made valid by the insertion of two principles: PI and P2. These, of course, are the principles that
I suggested might underwrite premise (2) of the first formalization of
Rowe's argument. It is worth emphasizing that inasmuch as Rowe offers
no explicit support for (2), he offers no explicit defence of these principles: they are entirely suppressed in his argument. Bruce Langtry,
Thomas Morris, and Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder have all recently criticized these principles. After briefly rejecting the arguments of
Langtry and Morris in Sections II and III, I offer, in Section IV, a detailed
analysis and criticism of the Howard-Snyders' complex argument
against Rowe.

Faith and Philosophy

214

II. Langtry's Criticisms of PI

Langtry offers two criticisms of Rowe, and both can be construed as objections to PI. Here is the first:
Does [NPW] imply that for any action actualising a world that God
can perform there is a morally better alternative action that he can
perform? No. It is logically necessary that if a being is omnipotent,
omniscient, and perfectly good then it cannot act in a morally better
way, or more rationally, than it in fact acts. What [NPW] implies is
that, given that an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being
is logically possible, there are worlds V and W such that V is better
than W, and God can actualise V without violating any moral duty,
but God's actualising V is not a morally better action, or more rational,
than his actualising WI! [emphasis added]Y
If this move is successful, PI founders and the inference from (7) to (8) is
undercut. Unfortunately, however, this move fails. Notice that Langtry
offers no argument against PI here. He merely observes that if a perfectly
good being is logically possible, then PI must be rejected. But Rowe's argument (as I have construed it) purports to be a reductio of the very claim that
a perfectly good being is logically possible, and the mere assertion of the
first premise of a reductio is not sufficient to show that the reductio fails. At
minimum, independent reasons for asserting such a premise must be established. Langtry, in effect, has merely shown he agrees with Rowe in thinking that ( NPW, (6), PI ) is an inconsistent set. 14 But he offers no reason for
thinking that PI should be rejected, rather than, say, (6).15
In an endnote, Langtry offers a second line of attack against Rowe. He
identifies and criticizes the following suppressed premise in Rowe's argument: " ... other things being equal, in intentionally bringing about the better state of affairs one acts in the morally better way."16 Since this premise is
a generalized version of PI, I will take Langtry's subsequent argument to
be a criticism of this moral principleY Langtry suggests that

... when a being is choosing a world to create from an infinite hierarchy of
better and better worlds, the conclusion that one could always have
acted in a morally better way is defeated by the fact that some worlds
are good enough. Rejection of what would be entirely acceptable were
it not for the option of choosing the better would be no sign of superior excellence of character; rather the defective nature of the attitude
would be shown in the paralysis and self-stultification which it
induced. IS
I take it that the second sentence in this passage is meant to support the
first. (Taken independently, the first statement merely asserts that there are
good enough worlds: worlds which, in this context, include God's existence.
But this amounts to another arbitrary rejection of PI, and accordingly does
not settle the question in Langtry's favour). The argument, then, appears to
be that PI is false because it would have a paralytic and stultifying effect
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on the agent who employs it as a rule for action in this context.
This, however, still does not suffice for the rejection of PI. A further
premise is required, such as (for instance) the claim that it is impossible
that God's actions be paralyzed or stultified. But such an assertion just
amounts to another arbitrary denial of Rowe's claim that (6), not PI,
should be rejected. In short, Langtry rejects PI because it (together with
NPW) appears to have unwelcome consequences for theism, but such a
rejection is unmotivated, because it offers no independent reason for thinking PI false. Rowe knows perfectly well that PI and NPW jointly have
unwelcome consequences for theism: his argument, after all, is an elaboration of this basic insight. 19
Here too, then, the disagreement between Rowe and Langtry can perhaps best be understood as before. They both appear to agree that { NPW,
(6), PI } is an inconsistent triad. To resolve this inconsistency, Rowe would
presumably prefer to argue from NPW and PI to the denial of (6), while
Langtry, as we have seen, argues from NPW and (1) to the denial of PI. But
neither offers independent reason for their preference: Rowe offers no
argument for PI, and Langtry offers no argument for (6). This debate, then,
ends in stalemate.

III. Thomas Morris' Criticisms ofP2
Thomas Morris does not address PI, but instead offers a criticism of P2.
His strategy is to suggest and attack two claims that might be thought to
underwrite this principle: 2u

The Production Thesis: The goodness of an agent's actions is productive
of the agent's goodness.
The Expression Thesis: The goodness of an agent's actions is expressive
of the agent's goodness.
Morris concedes that something like the production thesis may be true for
human beings: "Since at least the time of Aristotle, we have realized that
we can become good, at least in part, by doing good."2l He denies, though,
that the production thesis applies to God:
[I]f anything like the production thesis is true of any sorts of beings at
all, it is true only of beings with moral potential. A greatest possible
being is by definition not a being with moral potential. Thus, to
assume the unrestricted truth of the production thesis is just to beg
the question against perfect being theology.22
As for the expression thesis, Morris thinks that this may be trivially true of
human beings: however we act, even when we act akratically, we express
our goodness (or lack thereof). And he thinks that God's goodness is
expressed in his actions. 23 But he denies that this expressive connection
holds perfectly in God's case on NPW:
... failing to do the best you can is a flaw or manifests an incomplete-
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ness in moral character in this way only if doing the best you can is at
least a logical possibility. If doing the best he can in creating a world
is for God an impossibility [on NPW] ... then not doing his best in
creating cannot be seen as a flaw or as manifesting an incompleteness
in the character of God. The notion of a perfect expression of an
unsurpassable character would then itself be an incoherence. To
assume otherwise would, again, just be to beg the question against
perfect being theology.24
So Morris thinks that neither argument for P2 has merit, and, accordingly,
that P2 should be rejected.
Strictly speaking, it is not clear that Morris' argument concerning the
expression thesis engages Rowe: Rowe, recall, does not fault God for havingfailed to do his best in actualizing a world on NPW. Rowe's point, rather,
is that no matter what a being does on NPW with respect to world-actualization, that being is surpassable, in which case no such being can be God. 25
Leaving this aside, it is clear that Morris' arguments concerning the production thesis and the expression thesis have a common form: they both
allege that since these the thesis in question cannot sensibly apply to God,
it should not be used to support P2. In short, then, Morris' point seems to
be this: since the notion of a perfectly good being is coherent on NPW, P2
should be rejected. But this, like Langtry's argument, merely amounts to an
assertion of the first premise of Rowe's reductio, and, again, no such mere
assertion can undermine a reductio: independent argumentation is
required. 26
Morris thus appears to agree with Rowe that the following triad is
inconsistent: { NPW, (6), P2 }.27 And, while Rowe would presumably
endorse NPW and P2 in order to reject (6), Morris endorses (6) and NPW
in order to reject P2. But neither author offers any independent argument
for their preference: as noted, Rowe does not argue for P2, nor does Morris
argue for (6). This debate too, then, ends in stalemate.

IV. The Howard-Snyders' Criticism of Rowe
Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder advance an argument that purports to
show that, contra Rowe, perfect being theology is not incoherent on NPW.
It is not clear from the text whether their argument is to be construed as a
denial of PI or a denial of P2, but if their argument is successful, at least
one of these principles is false. 28 In this section, I outline and criticize their
complex argument.

Jove's Use of a Randomizing Device
In "How an Unsurpassable Being can Create A Surpassable World",
Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder introduce a novel thought-experiment. They imagine a being named Jove who is omnipotent, omniscient,
and unsurpassably good, and who is unable to actualize a prime world,
there being none. Jove divides the set of all possible worlds into two subsets based on certain axiologically-relevant criteria. 29 Worlds in the better
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subset are given unique ordinals: the worst of the lot receives '1', the second-worst '2', and so on.w Jove selects from these worlds at random, and
world no. 777 is actualized.3I The Howard-Snyders conclude that Jove's
" ... creating a world inferior to one he or some other possible being could
have created does nothing to impugn his status as essentially morally
unsurpassable in any respect whatsoever."32
To defend this strong claim, the Howard-Snyders consider three
alternative actions that a being in Jove's situation might perform, and they
conclude that none is morally better than Jove's action. 33 First, the HowardSnyders imagine that Jove might create nothing, such that the resulting
world contains only Jove and whatever other necessarily-existing entities
there may be. They argue that this course of action is not morally preferable
to the use of the randomizer, since world no.777 has much to recommend
it over the world that results when Jove creates nothing. 34 Second, they
imagine that another perfect being, Juno, uses the randomizer and actualizes world no.999. They hold that Juno's action is no better than Jove's,
smce
[fjactors outside of one's control can make a difference to how much
good one brings about without making a difference to how good one
is. Jove has no control over what number his randomizer will deliver.
Thus, given his resolve to let the device do its thing, it is not up to
him which [world] ... is actualized. And precisely the same can be
said about Juno. Thus, even if a better world results from Juno's
using the device, that's no reason to infer that she is morally better
thanJove.~'

So far, the Howard-Snyders' case is un controversial. Some controversy has
arisen concerning the third alternative action that they propose, however,
and so I tum to this now.

Thor's Action and Rowe's Criticism
The Howard-Snyders next imagine that an omnipotent and omniscient
being, Thor, eschews the randomizer and instead actualizes world no.888.
The Howard-Snyders reject two reasons for thinking that Thor is better
than Jove. They first urge that, ceteris paribus, Thor's putative bettemess
cannot
... consist in the fact that Thor actualized a better world than Jove.
For given that Jove and Juno are morally equivalent, if Thor is better
than Jove, then he's better than Juno; but the world Thor actualizes is
inferior to the world Juno actualizes. So if Thor is better than Jove, it
must be in virtue of some other difference between them. 36
Second, they urge that Thor's attitude (in rejecting the randomizer) must
not be thought superior to Jove's attitude:
The important point to see here is that given a choice between infi-

218

Faith and Philosophy

nitely many progressively better worlds to actualize, Jove wisely
rejects Thor's principle that if there's a better world than w, don't create W, not because he is casual or uncaring or objectionably settling
for less, but because that principle in that context would lead him
(and Thor, were he rational) to do nothing, which is far worse than
using the randomizer [emphasis added].37
William Rowe objects to this last point. He suggests that Thor " ... selects
world no. 888 over Jove's world no. 777 because he sees that it is better and
prefers creating no. 888 to creating any lesser world."38 Accordingly, Rowe
thinks that Thor cannot be following the principle that the HowardSnyders impute to him, for if he were, he would not settle for 888: " ...
knowing that he must select among infinitely many progressively better
worlds, such a principle would prohibit Thor from creating the world he
does create, no. 888."39
Rowe's point here is unfair to the spirit (if not, perhaps, the letter) of the
Howard-Snyders' argument. The Howard-Snyders do not mean to suggest
that Thor acts on this principle; clearly, he doesn't. Rather, they meant to
point out that if Thor adopts this principle, since he knows that there is no
prime world, his decision to actualize world no.888 is irrational, and,
accordingly, Thor cannot be an unsurpassable being. 40 In any event, Rowe
offers a new argument for the conclusion that Thor is morally better than
Jove:
Thor's degree of moral goodness presumably is such that he is prepared to settle for world no. 888, but not to settle for the world
(no.777) that Jove's degree of moral goodness allows him to settle for.
We thus have reason to believe that Thor's degree of moral goodness
exceeds Jove's, that Thor is morally better than Jove. 41
If Thor is morally better them Jove, then Jove is - after all - a surpassable
being, and the Howard-Snyders' argument fails.

The Howard-Snyders' Response to Rowe
Recently, the Howard-Snyders have responded to this argument. 42 Crucial
premises of their response tum on the sorting process that a prospective creator would use to bisect the set of all worlds into (i) a set of worlds the
being is unprepared to actualize; and (ii) a set of worlds the being is prepared
to actualize. The Howard-Snyders' original paper explained this process as
follows:
Although [Jove] can create any [world], he can't create the best of
them because there is no best. Faced with this predicament, Jove first
sorts the worlds according to certain criteria. For example, he puts on
his left worlds in which some inhabitants live lives that aren't worth
living and on his right worlds in which every inhabitant's life is
worth living; he puts on his left worlds in which some horrors fail to
serve some outweighing good and on his right worlds in which no
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horror fails to serve an outweighing good. (We encourage the reader
to use her own criteria). Then he orders the right hand worlds
according to their goodness and assigns to each a positive natural
number, the worst of the lot receiving '1', the second worst '2', and so
on.43
Since Jove's randomizer selects from all the 'right-hand' worlds, Jove must
be prepared to actualize anyone of them. 44
The Howard-Snyders agree with Rowe that the salient difference
between Jove and Thor is that Thor, unlike Jove, is prepared to settle for
888 (even though there are infinitely many better worlds) but unprepared
to settle for 777. They further suppose that" ... Thor, unlike Jove, is not prepared to settle for any world less than no. 888" .45 Jove thus bisects the set of
all possible worlds at (just below) world no. 1, while Thor bisects the set of
all possible worlds at (just below) no. 888. The Howard-Snyders' argument
begins with the following disjunction: 46
(12) Thor either has or lacks a principle that justifies his unwillingness to settle for any world less than no. 888.
The Howard-Snyders think that any principle that justifies a bisection must
satisfy the following conditions: 47
It divides the set of possible worlds into two groups (the acceptable and the unacceptable);48
(ii) It is a reasonable principle that a morally good being might well
use to sort worlds (i.e. it is neither morally defective nor wholly
frivolous);
(iii) It is such that it is not irrational [or immoral] to act in accordance with it without acting in accordance with one which
expresses a higher standard. 49

(i)

Such principles can be ranked: a principle that justifies a bisection at (just
below) world x is higher than a principle that justifies a bisection at (just
below) world y just in case x is a better world than y. And the HowardSnyders appear to assume that the higher the principle, the better that principle is.50 It is clear that on NPW, there are infinitely many possible points
at which to bisect the set of all possible worlds. If each of these bisections
could be justified by a principle that meets conditions (i)-(iii), then there
would be no highest principle justifying a bisection: for any such principle,
a higher (and better) principle would be possible. The Howard-Snyders
reject this view. Their argument may be expressed as follows:
(13) Either there is a highest principle that satisfies conditions (i)(iii), or there is not.
(14) There is a highest principle that satisfies (i)-(iii).sl
(15) Jove acts on this principle. 52
(16 Therefore, no being can act on a higher principle than Jove's
principle.
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(17) Therefore, Thor lacks a principle for being unprepared to settle

for any world less than 888.
The Howard-Snyders have a very strategic reason for asserting (14). If (14)
is false, they fear that Rowe might argue in the following manner:
It is possible for Thor to act on a principle which was neither morally

defective nor frivolous nor such that anyone who embraced it would
be rationally compelled to rule out more and more worlds ad infinitum. But since for every principle there is one which expresses a higher standard, Jove had to embrace one which was not the highest. For
any principle Jove possibly embraces, however, I stipulate that Thor
embraces a higher one that would result in his treating as unacceptable some worlds that Jove would treat as acceptable. Thus, Thor is
necessarily morally superior to Jove ... 53
To block this move, then, the Howard-Snyders assert (14) and stipulate, in
(15), that Jove acts on the highest partition principle there is. The HowardSnyders' dialectical reason for asserting (14), then, is clear. But what are
their philosophical reasons? The Howard-Snyders make just three claims in
defense of (14):
(iv) "It seems odd to say the least that there should be infinitely
many such general principles."54
(v) "At least we see no reason to accept that there are [infinitely
many such general principles]."55
(vi) " .. .it is not reasonable to believe that there are infinitely many
principles which satisfy constraints (i)_(iii)."56
By themselves, these claims do not constitute an argument for (14). I will
return to this point below. First, however, the remainder of the HowardSnyders' argument must be outlined. Having concluded that Thor lacks a
good principle for bisecting just below no. 888, the Howard-Snyders continue with an argument best expressed as a constructive dilemma: 57
(18) Since Thor lacks such a principle, either he selects no. 888 arbitrarily, or he is determined by his nature to select no. 888.
(19) If Thor is determined by his nature to select no. 888, then his
unpreparedness to select a world worse than no. 888 is nothing
other than a tendency to act in accordance with (as opposed to a
tendency to act on) a principle that satisfies conditions (i)-(iii).
(20) Either there is a highest principle that satisfies conditions (i)(iii), or there is not.
(21) There is a highest principle that satisfies (i)-(iii).
(22) Jove acts on this principle.
(23), Therefore, no being can act in accordance with a higher principle
than Jove's principle.
(24) Therefore, if Thor is determined by his nature to select no. 888,
Jove is morally unsurpassable.
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(25) If Thor selects no. 888 arbitrarily, then he is not morally better

than Jove.
(26) Therefore, if Thor selects no. 888 arbitrarily, Jove is morally

unsurpassable.
(27) Jove is morally unsurpassable. [from (18), (24), and (26)]

On the Howard-Snyders' story, then, Jove uses an unsurpassable partition
principle that satisfies (i)-(iii) in order to sort worlds, and then randomly
selects a world from the higher subset for actualization. For any world
selected by the randomizer, there are infinitely many better worlds that
Jove has the power to actualize. But were Jove (or anybody else) to actualize any world better than the one selected by the randomizer, either this
would not be a better action, or it would be a better action, but Jove (or anybody else) would not be a better agent for performing it. Thus, if the
Howard-Snyders' argument concerning Jove is sound, then at least one of
these moral principles is false: 58
PI

If it is possible for the product / outcome of a world-actualizing
action performed by some being to have been better, then,
ceteris paribus, it is possible for that action to have been better.

P2

If it is possible for the world-actualizing action performed by
some being to have been better, then, ceteris paribus, it is possible for that being to have been better.

Thus the Howard-Snyders conclude that Rowe's argument fails.

Criticisms of the Howard-Snyders' Defence of Jove
Premises (18) and (19) may be controversial, but I will not address them in
what follows. Notice that (21) is identical to (14). I pointed out above that
the Howard-Snyders offer no argument for (14). The same is true of (21).
To the extent that these crucial premises are unsupported, then, the
Howard-Snyders' argument in (12)-(27) is unconvincing. A stronger criticism would, of course, show that (14) and (21) are false, thereby undercutting the Howard-Snyders' argument in two places. I have no such criticism, but I can offer some modest considerations against (14) and (21).
These reasons are not decisive, but they are, I think, suggestive. I first offer
these considerations, and I then develop an independent criticism of the
Howard-Snyders' argument on the concessive assumption that (14) and
(21) are, after all, true.

Modest Considerations against (14) and (21)
The Howard-Snyders suggest several sample partition principles which,
they claim, satisfy conditions (i)-(iii):59
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(vii) No world in which beings live lives which are not worth living
is acceptable;
(viii) No world in which beings experience gratuitous suffering is
acceptable;
(ix) No world in which beings live lives which are not as happy and
fulfilled as those lives could possibly be is acceptable;
(x) No world empty of sentient, rational beings is acceptable.
Each of these principles suggests a certain property which, if instantiated,
tends to make the resulting world good. (Let's call these world-good-makingproperties, or WGMPs). The partition principles (viii)-(x) divide the set of
possible worlds into those that have, and those that lack, a given WGMP.
Clearly, there are many different candidate WGMPs, and so many further
partition principles could be devised in the manner of (vii)-(x). On the
Howard-Snyders' view, these could be ranked too.
Now, if there is only a finite number of WGMPs, then there can only be
a finite number of principles that take the form of (vii)-(x): principles which
divide the set of possible worlds into those which have and those which
lack a given WGMP. If so, at least one such principle must be unsurpassably high. But there is absolutely no reason to think that there is a finite
number of WGMPs. And if there is an infinite number of WGMPs, then,
possibly, there is no highest principle that takes the form of (vii}-(x) and
meets conditions (i)-(iii).6()
It might be replied that this argument illicitly assumes that all partition
principles take the form of (vii)-(x) by referring only to one WGMP.61
Perhaps, for example, there is a single partition principle that refers to
every WGMP that there is, even if there are infinitely many such properties. (Devising such a principle, of course, would not be a problem for an
omniscient agent.) This principle would, then, divide the set of possible
worlds into those in which every WGMP is instantiated, and those in which
this is not the case. If there were such a principle, it might be thought
unsurpassable, in which case the Howard-Snyders are entitled to stipulate
it to be the one that Jove employs. It is not obvious, however, that such a
principle would be unsurpassable. It is simply not clear that worlds in
which every WGMP is instantiated are better than those in which not every
WGMP is instantiated. 62 Perhaps at some point, or in certain combinations,
the instantiation of more WGMPs no longer makes worlds better. Thus this
proposal fails to show that there is an unsurpassable partition principle. 63
Moreover, this proposal assumes that every WGMP is an "all-or-nothing" property, and this, I believe, is false. Many plausible WGMPs are
degreed properties; indeed, advocates of NPW typically rely on just such
properties to support NPW, since, they argue, there are some WGMPs that
simply cannot be maximally instantiated in some world. Richard
Swinburne, Bruce Reichenbach, and George SchleSinger all argue in this
manner. 64 Richard Swinburne takes this view in the following passage:
... take any world W. Presumably the goodness of such a world ...
will consist in part in it containing a finite or infinite number of conscious beings who will enjoy it. But if this enjoyment of the world by
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each is a valuable thing, surely a world with a few more conscious
beings in it would be a yet more valuable world - for there would be
no reason why the existence of the latter should detract from the
enjoyment of the world by others - they would always be put some
considerable distance away from others, so that there was no mutual
interference. I conclude that it is not, for conceptual reasons, plausible
to suppose that there could be a best of all possible worlds, and in
consequence God could not have overriding reason to create one. os
This passage seems to suggest the following WGMP:
(xi) There being a great number of conscious beings who enjoy the
world.
This WGMP can fail to be instantiated at all in a world, but, there being no
unsurpassably great number, it seems that this WGMP cannot be maximally
instantiated in any world. 66
Bruce Reichenbach offers a more general account of how worlds
might be thought better and better ad infinitum:
What sorts of states of affairs are counted as the most beneficial or
optimific? Hedonism suggests states of affairs which produce pleasure; utilitarianism suggests utility; eudaimonism, happiness. Other
possibilities would include the production of the most virtue, moral
goodness, or goodwill in the world. But no matter which of these be
accepted, whether individually or in combination, ... one could
imagine an infinite series of optimific states in which for any amount
of optimific states of affairs n, one could conceive of n+ 1 states of
affairs, or considered qualitatively for any degree of optimificity in
the world one could conceive of even more optimificity ... Thus there
could be no best possible world, since for any world which we could
name there would always be another which was more optimific.67
On this view, another WGMP would be:

(xii) The world's being comprised of optimific states of affairs.
Again, while this property may fail to obtain in some worlds, it seems that
- if Reichenbach is right - this property cannot be maximally instantiated
in any given world.
George Schlesinger argues in similar fashion, employing the still more
general notion of the degree of desirability of a state" (DDS). Schlesinger
does not say precisely wherein the DDS consists, but it appears that the
desirability of a state is equivalent to the goodness of that state. (States need
not be desired in order to be desirable, nor desirable in order to be
desired.)iiH The desirability of a state can thus be mapped against an
absolute external scale, and Schlesinger urges that this scale has no upper
limit:
U
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Now I take it that, conceptually, there is no limit to the degree which
the desirability of a state may reach ... A mortal's possibilities are
physically limited, hence there is, in his case, a natural limit which
applies to the principle ['increase the DDS as much as possible'] but
there is no limit to what God can do. It is, therefore, logically impossible for him to fulfill the ethical principle, i.e., to do enough to discharge his obligation to raise the DDS of every creature to the height
beyond which he cannot increase it. Just as it is logically impossible
to name the highest integer, it is impossible to grant a creature a DDS
higher than which is inconceivable; thus it is logically impossible for
God to fulfill what is required by the universal ethical principle and
therefore he cannot fulfill it, and is therefore not obliged to fulfill it. 69
Schlesinger'S WGMP, then, is
(xiii) The states of affairs' (that comprise creaturely existence in the
world) being desirable.
Again, while worlds may lack property (xiii), on Schlesinger's account,
there is no world in which property (xiii) is unsurpassably instantiated.
These degreed WGMPs can be used to develop partition-justifying principles that do not take the form of (vii)-(x). Consider these examples:
(xiv) No world below level L (at which there are fewer than x conscious free creatures who enjoy the world) is acceptable;70
(xv) No world in which the optimificity of the states of affairs that comprise that world falls below level L is acceptable;
(xvi) No world in which the desirability of the states of affairs that comprise creaturely existence in that world falls below level L is
acceptable.
(Equally, of course, these degreed WGMPs might be included in partition
principles that refer to many WGMPs.) For consistency, the HowardSnyders should presumably insist there is some maximum level L beyond
which all putative partition-justifying principles fail to satisfy at least one
of critiera (i)-(iii). But why should all putative principles beyond some such
level L be morally defective, frivolous, or such that their invocation renders
the invoking agent irrational? Such an insistence seems entirely at odds
with the very reasons that motivate NPW. So it is very difficult to imagine
how the Howard-Snyders could consistently argue for this view.
The Howard-Snyders assert (14) and (21) - the claim that there is an
unsurpassable partition principle - in order to next stipulate that Jove acts
on this principle. They stipulate this in order to block Rowe from stipulating that Thor acts on a higher principle than Jove's. I have offered modest
considerations against (14) and (21). While these considerations are not
decisive, they do suggest that the Howard-Snyders' insistence that there is
a highest partition principle requires significant argument in order to be
compelling. That said, it can be shown that Jove is surpassable even if (14)
and (21) are granted. I take up this task next.
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Jove's Surpassibility Granting (14) and (21)
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that (14) and (21) are granted.
Suppose, in other words, that the Howard-Snyders are right to assert
that there is an unsurpassable partition principle that a being could
use to bisect the set of possible worlds. Even in this case it can be
shown that Jove - who, by stipulation, uses such a principle - is surpassable. To see this, notice that there is a logical distinction between
the partition principle a creator uses to bisect the set of possible
worlds and the 'subsequent' decision procedure he uses to select a
world for actualization from the higher subset. Since I am here granting (14) and (21), I assume that a being who selects a world from that
subset cannot possibly act on or act in accordance with a higher principle than Jove's. But does it follow tout court that such a being cannot
be better than Jove?
No. Consider Odin, an exceedingly good, omnipotent, omniscient
being, who faces the world-actualization problem on NPW. Odin divides
possible worlds according to the highest partition-justifying principle that
there is: Jove's principle. Whereas Jove proceeds to select randomly from
the upper subset of worlds, Odin employs the following decision procedure: he takes the ordinal selected by Jove's randomizer, adds one, and
actualizes the resulting world. Whatever world Jove actualizes, then, Odin
actualizes one better.
This thought-experiment is not frivolous: it shows that Jove is surpassable. Odin is certainly no worse than Jove (on the Howard-Snyders' analysis) with respect to the partition-justifying principle he chooses, since he
too uses the highest such principle that there (by hypothesis) is: Jove's principle. His logically-subsequent decision procedure invariably results in better outcomes than does Jove's, so there is at least some reason to think that
he, Odin, is better than Jove l Odin may perhaps be surpassable, but even
if surpassable, if he is superior to Jove (by virtue of employing a logicallysubsequent decision procedure that always returns a better outcome), then,
ceteris paribus, Jove is, after all, surpassable.
The Howard-Snyders might object that Odin, as described, does not in
fact use Jove's partition principle. Such an argument might proceed as follows:
Odin will never actualize Jove's world no.l, since, even if Jove's randomizer generates no.l, Odin will actualize world no.2. Therefore,
Odin's set of actualizable worlds, in effect, differs from Jove's, in
which case Odin must be using a partition principle different from
Jove's. And, since Jove's partition principle (by stipulation) is unsurpassable, Odin's cannot be better, and so it is false that Odin is better
than Jove.
While it is true that Odin will never actualize world no.l, this cannot by
itself show that Odin's partition principle differs from Jove's. There is, after
all, an important distinction between partition principles and logically-subsequent decision procedures, and, as described, Odin and Jove differ only
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with respect to the latter. I urged earlier that the Howard-Snyders' account
of partitioning should be construed to mean the right-hand worlds are
prima facie acceptable for actualization, and so there is no inconsistency
between Odin's finding a certain set of worlds (namely, Jove's set) prima
facie acceptable for actualization, and its being the case that Odin will
never, in fact, actualize the worst world in that set, no.I." Indeed, if it
shows anything at all, this objection suggests another reason for thinking
that Odin is better than Jove: not only will Odin always actualize a better
world than the one that Jove actualizes, Odin, unlike Jove, will never actualize world no.1. So much the better, say I, for Odin!
Alternatively, the Howard-Snyders might concede that Odin is better
than Jove in virtue of always actualizing a better world, but insist that Odin
does not surpass Jove on the whole, since Odin uses a decision procedure
that is suspect in some way. In particular, the Howard-Snyders might
claim that Odin's decision procedure is suspect because it fails to satisfy
some new conditions, such as these variants of (ii) and (iii):
(ii') It is a reasonable decision procedure that a morally good being
might well use to select worlds (Le. it is neither morally defective nor wholly frivolous);
(iii') It is a decision procedure such that it is not irrational [or immoral]
to act on or in accordance with it without acting on or in accordance with one which expresses a higher standard.
But, while Odin's decision procedure may not satisfy these new conditions,
it would be unreasonable to require that it should, since these are variants
of necessary conditions on the partition principle of an unsurpassable being,
and Odin is not advanced as a candidate for this post: I argue only that
Odin surpasses Jove. In short, these alleged deficiencies in Odin can show
at most that he is surpassable, not that he fails to surpass Jove. They are
therefore irrelevant to the issue at hand. Odin's decision procedure, I submit, is no stranger, and no more arbitrary, than Jove's decision procedure.
In fact, it contrasts favourably with Jove's, since it always returns a better
outcome, and this provides reason for thinking that Jove is, after all, surpassable. So this imagined reply also misses the mark.
The Howard-Snyders intended to defend the unsurpassability of Jove in
order to undermine Rowe's a priori argument for atheism. If, that is, Jove
(as described) could exist on NPW, then Rowe's argument fails, either
because PI fails or because P2 fails?3 The Howard-Snyders' argument for
the unsurpassability of Jove turns on the claim that there is a finite number
of partition principles, and that Jove acts on the highest of these. I first
argued that the Howard-Snyders have not shown that there are only finitely many such principles, and I suggested that there may well be infinitely
many. I then urged that even if there is a highest principle, it does not follow that Jove is unsurpassable, since it is reasonable to believe that Jove's
decision procedure for selecting a world for actualization is surpassable.
Thus, the Howard-Snyders' effort to undermine Rowe's argument is
unsuccessful.
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V. Concluding Remarks
William Rowe's a priori argument for atheism is elegant, and it may be
thought to appeal to some plausible moral intuitions. I have shown that it
withstands Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder's complex criticism.
Further, I have shown that neither Langtry's criticisms of PI nor Morris'
objections to P2 are decisive, since they depend on assumptions which
Rowe would reject. But, of course, this does not mean that Rowe's argument is sound. Space does not permit a detailed criticism of this argument
itself, but I should point out that its success depends on the unrestricted
truth of PI and P2. As I noted above, Rowe conflates these crucial premises
in his exposition. To the extent that these principles are undefended, then,
Rowe's argument is insufficiently supported. Attention to this matter may
provide the most fruitful avenue for further discussion of this intriguing
argument. 74
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NOTES
1. The expression 'prime world' in this context is due to Bruce Langtry in
"God and the Best", Faith and Philosophy 13 (1996): 311-328. NPW differs from
NBW (the view that there is no best world) only if there are possible worlds that
God cannot actualize. In what follows, I will remain neutral on whether there
are such worlds, and, therefore, neutral on whether NPW differs from NBW.
Space does not permit a detailed excursion into difficult questions concerning
what sorts of factors contribute to (or detract from) the goodness of worlds, how
these factors so contribute (or detract), whether all worlds are commensurable,
etc. I will simply assume for the sake of discussion that worlds can be ranked in
terms of goodness, and in Section IV, I will assume (for simplicity only) that
there are no ties, and that all worlds are commensurable.
2. In fact, the distinction is not always drawn between NPW and NBW,
and so some authors urge that if there is no best world, it follows that God cannot sensibly be expected to do his best in creating a world. Thus Peter Forrest
suggests that "[i]t is plausible that for every possible world there could be a
better one ... If this is the case, God could not create the best possible world,
just as he could not name the greatest integer" ("The Problem of Evil: Two
Neglected Defences", Sophia 20 (1981): 52. Similar arguments can be found in
Reichenbach, B., "Must God Create the Best Possible World?", International
Philosophical Quarterly 19 (1979): 203-212, and Evil and a Good God, New York:
Fordham University Press, 1982, Chapter 6; Schlesinger, G. Religion and
Scientific Method, Boston, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1977, Chapter 9);
Swinburne, R, The Existence of God, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, 113-114,
144ff; and Kretzmann, N., "A Particular Problem of Creation: Why Would God
Create This World?", in Being and Goodness [5. MacDonald, Ed.], Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1991, 229-250.
3. William Wainwright observes that

[t]he critic complains that God could have created a better order. But
even if God had created a better order, he would be exposed to the possi-
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bility of a similar complaint [on NPW]. Indeed, [on NPW] no created
order is such that God would not be exposed to the possibility of a complaint of this sort. The complaint is thus inappropriate. Even though
there are an infinite number of created orders better than our own, God
can't be faulted simply because He created an order inferior to other
orders that He might have created in their place (Philosophy of Religion,
Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1988,90).
Note that Wainwright only intends to defend theism against the specific
(but abstract) charge that God could have created a better world than the actual
world on NPW. William Rowe endorses this defence in "The Problem of
Divine Perfection and Freedom", in Reasoned Faith [Stump, E., Ed.], Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1993,230.
4. Arguments of this form on NPW are discussed in Basinger, D. "In What
Sense Must God Be Omnibenevolent?", International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 14 (1983): 3-15; Chrzan, K. "The Irrelevance of the No Best Possible
World Defense", Philosophia 17 (1987): 161-166; Elliot, R. "Divine Perfection,
Axiology, and the No Best World Defence", Religious Studies 29 (1993): 533-542;
and Kretzmann, N. "A Particular Problem of Creation".
5. William Rowe offers this argument in "The Problem of Divine
Perfection and Freedom", 230. Others who discuss a similar argument include
Stephen Grover (in "Why Only the Best is Good Enough", Analysis 48 (1988):
224); Jeff Jordan (in liThe Problem of Divine Exclusivity", International Journal
for Philosophy of Religion 33 (1993): 92££), and Norman Kretzmann (in" A
Particular Problem of Creation", 238). Strictly speaking, such arguments are
not arguments from evil, since they are a priori. Rather, they might best be
understood as arguments from claims concerning the surpassability of world-actual-

izing agents on NPW.
6. Howard-Snyder, D. and Howard-Snyder, F., "How an Unsurpassable
Being can Create a Surpassable World", Faith and Philosophy 11 (1994): 260-268;
Langtry, B., "God and the Best"; and Morris, T., "Perfection and Creation", in
Reasoned Faith [E. Stump, Ed.], Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993,234-247.
7. "The Problem of Divine Perfection and Freedom", 230.
8. "God and the Best", note 8, 327.
9. Commenting on Rowe's argument, William Morris states that
"[s]imply put, the idea seems to be that, all else equal, the better the product,
the better the act; the better the act, the better the agent" ("Perfection and
Creation", 241).
10. Rowe's original argument refers to the moral goodness of worlds. I have
dropped this modifier in (6)-(11), since it is both implausible and unnecessary.
It is implausible because moral goodness is best understood to be a feature of
actions or perhaps agents, rather than a feature of states of affairs such as worlds.
And it is unnecessary because Rowe's argument does not depend on this modifier in any way. (For a simpler formalization of Rowe's argument that retains
the reference to the moral goodness of worlds, see Morris, T. "Perfection and
Creation", 240.)
11. If the goodness of the world-actualizing action is itself a contributing
factor to the overall goodness of the resulting world, then, given the ceteris
paribus clause, PI is trivially true. (The state of affairs consisting in a worldactualizing action, after all, is included in the state of affairs that comprises that
world.) Since PI is intended to be a substantive, non-trivial claim, I propose to
treat the goodness of a world independently of the goodness-conferring role that
might be played by the relevant actualizing activity.
Also, while Rowe's original argument refers only to moral betterness, it
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seems that the being might also be thought better in terms of rationality. For
this reason, I have refrained from modifying 'better' with 'morally' in PI and
P2. Bruce Langtry sketches a Rowe-style argument that turns on rationality in
"God and the Best", 321ff.
12. Rowe originally argued for the non-existence of God on NPW. The
argument in (6)-(11) is stronger, since it argues for the impossibility of God on
NPW. But if God is taken to be a necessary being, this is a distinction without a
difference.
13. Langtry, B., "God and the Best", 320. Langtry's position seems consistent with Aquinas' view of the matter:
When it is said that God can make a thing better than He makes it, if
better is taken substantively, this proposition is true. For He can always
make something else better than each individual thing: and He can make
the same thing in one way better than it is, and in another way not, as
explained above. If, however, better is taken as an adverb, implying the manner of the making; thus God cannot make anything better than he makes it,
because He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it implies
the manner of the thing done, He can make something better, because he
can give to things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards
the accidents, although not as regards the substance (Summa Theologiae, Q
25, Art. 6, emphasis added.)
14. This way of understanding the debate was suggested to me by
Jonathan Strand's comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I leave out P2
here, since it is not directly relevant to the discussion between Rowe and
Langtry.
15. Langtry may tacitly concede this very point in the following passage:
It might be objected, "If V is better than W, and God can actualise V
without violating any moral rules, then it follows that God has better reasons for actualising V than for actualising W, and so that God would be
acting irrationally if he actualised W rather than V". Either these things do
not follow, or else an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being is logically impossible, or else there are prime worlds [emphasis added, "God and the
Best", 320].

Rowe, I take it, would agree.
16. ibid., n.S, 327.
17. Though Langtry formulates this principle in a general manner, he
objects to its application to the context of world-actualization, and so Langtry's
objection can properly be understood as a criticism of PI.
IS. "God and the Best", n.S, 327.
19. In his commentary on an earlier version of this paper, Wes Morriston
holds that P1 naturally suggests two rules for action:
(Rl) Always do the action with the better possible outcome; and
(R2) For any possible act A, if there is an alternative possibility with a
better outcome, then don't do A.
Morriston continues: "But then surely Langtry's point is correct. If there
were no best possible outcome [on NPW], (R2) would indeed lead to paralysis.
Consequently, I think he might argue with some plausibility that Rl and R2
are not acceptable rules for the no prime world situation. If this is right, then
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God's failure to follow them in this special case would not demonstrate a
moral defect" ("Commentary on Klaas Kraay's 'William Rowe's A Priori
Argument from Evil''', Pacific APA 2002, 3.) I agree that God's failure to follow
these rules would not demonstrate a moral defect. But Rowe, I think, does not
mean to suggest that it would. Rowe's point, rather, is that no matter what a
being does with respect to world-actualization on NPW, that being is always
surpassable (in which case no being can be God on NPW). In other words, for
Rowe, the logical impossibility of following such a rule on NPW counts against
the possibility of God's existence, not against the rule. I argue below, however,
that this identification of (6) as the culprit - rather than P1- is unmotivated.
Morriston also suggests a different argument supporting Langtry's conclusion: perhaps " ... God does not fail to actualize a better world because he is
indifferent to higher levels of goodness, but because his desire to actualize a
very good world is so strong that it cannot be defeated by the fact that there is
no best world for him to choose" (ibid). Rowe, it seems, could agree both that a
creative agent need not be indifferent to higher levels of goodness, and that
such an agent could have a strong and laudable desire to actualize a very good
world. But Rowe remains free to suggest that on NPW, such a creative agent is
always surpassable, in which no such agent can be God.
20. "Perfection and Creation", 242.
21. ibid.
22. ibid., 243.
23. ibid., 244. I thank Wes Morriston for reminding me of this.
24. ibid.
25. An anonymous referee suggests that the NPW situation is, in one crucial respect, similar to an alternate scenario on which there are very many
equally-good worlds, all of which are unsurpassable. In both cases, this referee
holds, God's inability to actualize the best world (there being none) should not
count against God. This is true, but, like Morris' argument concerning the
expression thesis, it is not directly relevant. The claim at issue is not that God is
surpassable on NPW because he fails to actualize the best world; rather, God is
held to be surpassable on NPW for having failed to actualize a better world.
26. One way to offer independent argument against P2 would be to claim
that it is objectionable, since it depends on a view concerlling the relationship
between the goodness of actions and the goodness of agents that is simply
implausible in human affairs. Strictly speaking, Morris' arguments do not take
this form, since he concentrates on the logical point that neither the production
thesis nor the expression thesis could sensibly apply to God. That said, Morris
does seem committed to the other claim in the following passage:
Suppose that I give you five dollars. I could have given you ten, but I
give you five. Suppose you do not particularly need the gift, nor do you
need to be the recipient of a gift. Suppose, in other words, that it's pure
supererogation on my part. I do a good deed that did not need to be
done. If someone else instead had given you ten dollars, would it have
been the case that she did a better deed than 17 Would she, therefore, all
else equal, have been a better person than 17 I'm not convinced that this
follows at all (241).
And, referring to this argument a few pages later, Morris dellies " ... that
even in the human domain supererogation is always productive of the good in
any highly specific, additive way" (243).
I am sympathetic to Morris' rejection of a specific, additive relationship
between the goodness of supererogatory actions and the goodness of human
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agents. It does seem implausible to suppose that there is a law-like connection
between even marginally-better supererogatory actions and the goodness of
human agents. And Morris' point is to some degree relevant to the case of
divine world-actualization, since this is standardly held to be an act of pure
supererogation. That said, I do not think that Morris' claims concerning human
supererogation count against P2, for P2 does not depend on there being such a
strict, additive relationship between actions and agents. P2, recall, holds only
that if it is possible for the world-actualizing action performed by some being to
be better, then, ceteris paribus, it is possible for that being to have been better.
On NPW, for any world that God actualizes, there are infinitely-many better
worlds that God could have actualized instead. Granting PI, then, there are
then infinitely-many better actions that God could have performed. If the performance of even one of these actions would entail that the world-actualizer is a
better agent, then P2 stands, notwithstanding Morris' argument. And it seems
implauSible to suppose that the performance of none of these infinitely many
better actions would entail that the world-actualizer is a better agent. Similarly,
while it may be that a supererogatory gift of ten dollars does not entail that the
giver is better than he who gave only five, it is plausible to suppose that the
performance of some possible action would entail that the agent is better than he
who gave only five.
27. I leave out PI here, since it is not directly relevant to the discussion
between Rowe and Morris.
28. In personal correspondence, Daniel Howard-Snyder assures me that
their intended target was P2: "We definitely took ourselves to be undermining
P2, if moral goodness is what's under discussion. I suppose we were grantingfor the sake of argument, but only for the sake of argument - that PI is true"
Gune 27, 2001).
29. The Howard-Snyders say little about what the sorting criteria might be
- they merely offer candidates: "For example, he puts on his left worlds in
which some inhabitants live lives that aren't worth living and on his right
worlds in which every inhabitant's life is worth living; he puts on his left
worlds in which some horror fail to serve an outweighing good and on his
right worlds in which no horror fails to serve an outweighing good. (We
encourage the reader to use her own criteria)" (ibid., 260). I will return to this
point in Section IV.
30. The Howard-Snyders assume for the sake of simplicity that there are no
ties, and that all worlds are commensurable. I will follow them in this.
31. It is not clear to me whether an omniscient agent would know in
advance what number the randomizer would generate. In either case, however, Jove's knowledge (or lack thereof) seems irrelevant to the Howard-Snyders'
argument.
32. Howard-Snyder, D. and F., "How an Unsurpassable Being can Create a
Surpassable World", 261. In more mundane affairs, random processes can
return better results than deliberate optimizing strategies. Canada's Globe and
Mail reports that in a recent stock market competition where professional analysts were asked to choose just one stock selection which was then monitored
for one year, " ... a clockwork Santa toy beat the pros in a stunning victory with
a blistering 179.2% return with the randomly selected Denbury Resources Inc",
("Plastics Firm helps Misener maintain Lead in Stock Contest", Globe and Mail,
July 14, 2001, B9.) The Globe reports that the 2001 wildcard competitor is Jahe, a
young female orangutang from the Toronto zoo. As of July 2001, Jahe was
ranked fifth, but was still significantly outperforming the TSE 300 composite
index.
33. This strategy suffices to show Jove's unsurpassability only if these three
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alternatives exhaust the field of plausible alternative actions. The HowardSnyders think that they do: "There are other ways in which an omnipotent
being could behave in Jove's predicament. But those we can think of are either
just plain silly or subject to the objections we've raised against 0), (ii), and (iii)"
("How an Unsurpassable Being can Create a Surpassable World", 265).
34. ibid., 262. Of course, if this 'bare world' has so little to recommend it,
then presumably it would not even belong to the set of 'right-hand' worlds
from which Jove selects randomly.
35. ibid., 263. Rowe agrees: "Even though Juno ends up producing a better
world than Jove, the Howard-Snyders are clearly right in viewing Jove and
Juno as morally equivalent" ("The Problem of No Best World", Faith and
Philosophy 11 (1994): 270).
36. "How an Unsurpassable Being can Create a Surpassable World", 264.

37. ibid.
38. "The Problem of No Best World", 269-270.

39. ibid.
40. In fact, the Howard-Snyders hold that irrationality is inconsistent with
essential omniscience. ("The Real Problem of No Best World", Faith and
Philosophy 13 (1996): 423. I disagree, since it seems entirely possible for a being
who has the essential property of knowing all true propositions to act capriciously, akratically, irresponsibly, or irrationally. I take it, though, that any of
these activities constitute some imperfection, in which case the being is surpassable.
41. "The Problem of No Best World", 270.
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